The Permanent Record / Dossier · Location & Movement
The Plate Log
You assume the camera on the pole is looking for stolen cars. It is. It is also writing down yours, and keeping it.
An automated license plate reader does not wait for a wanted car to pass. It photographs every plate it can see, stamps each one with a time and a place, and files it. When California's State Auditor looked at four police agencies in 2020, it found that 99.9 percent of the 320 million images Los Angeles had stored were of vehicles on no hot list at all, that the agencies were keeping them for years, sharing them with hundreds of other agencies they had not vetted, and never checking who searched them.
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Picture the old way of looking for a stolen car. An officer has a list of plate numbers on a clipboard and reads the plates in a parking lot one at a time. When a plate matches, there is a stop. When it does not, nothing is written down. The officer does not keep a notebook of every innocent car he passed that afternoon, because there would be no point and no time.
An automated license plate reader, ALPR for short, does the same comparison thousands of times faster. But it changes the second half of the bargain. The non-matches are written down too. Every plate is photographed, read by software, and saved with the date, the time and the GPS coordinates of the camera that saw it. The hit list is what the system checks against. The log is what it keeps.
Two Uses, One Database
Police describe the two halves in their own vocabulary. In a case that reached the Supreme Court of Virginia twice, the Fairfax County Police Department and the man suing it agreed on the terms. "Active use" is the alert: the camera reads a plate, the software compares it against a hot list of stolen vehicles and wanted people, and if there is a match an officer is told. The hot list can be loaded automatically from a server or typed in by hand with a note saying why the plate is wanted.
"Passive use" is everything else. Fairfax kept a database of the images its cameras captured and the GPS coordinates of where each was taken. It held that data for 364 days and then purged it. The database could be searched only by plate number, and only by officers trained and certified on the system. It was the passive use, the year-long log of cars that had not been wanted for anything, that the lawsuit was about.
California's State Auditor put the purpose of the log plainly. The stored images, its report said, provide value beyond immediate hit alerts, because personnel can search the accumulated images to determine the vehicles present at particular locations and to track vehicles' movements at particular times. That is the point of keeping them. A plate reader with no log is a faster clipboard. A plate reader with a log is a record of where cars went.
The hit list is what the system checks against. The log is what it keeps. Almost everything in the log is someone who was never on the list.
What California Found
In February 2020 the California State Auditor published Report 2019-118 on automated license plate readers. The audit looked in detail at four agencies: the Fresno Police Department, the Los Angeles Police Department, the Marin County Sheriff's Office and the Sacramento County Sheriff's Office. It also surveyed 391 police and sheriff's departments across the state.
The first finding was about scale and about who is in the data. Los Angeles had accumulated 320 million plate images over several years. Of those, only 400,000 had generated an immediate match against its hot lists. In the auditor's words, 99.9 percent of the ALPR images Los Angeles stores are for vehicles that were not on a hot list at the time the image was made.
The survey showed the systems were not a big-city curiosity. Seventy percent of the departments that responded said they operated an ALPR system or planned to. The auditor wrote that it was likely many of them had the same problems it found at the four agencies it visited.
The Rules Nobody Had Written Down
California had already legislated on this. Senate Bill 34, chaptered in 2015 and effective in 2016, added the ALPR provisions of the Civil Code that begin at section 1798.90.5. As the auditor summarized it, the law requires an agency running a plate reader to keep a usage and privacy policy that describes the system's purpose, who may use it, how the agency will share the data, how it will protect and monitor the system, and how long it will keep the data. It requires reasonable security procedures to protect the data from unauthorized access, use, modification or disclosure. And it allows the data to be shared only with public agencies.
None of the four agencies had a policy that met all of those requirements. Los Angeles, the agency with 320 million images, had not developed an ALPR policy at all. The other three had not completely or clearly said who had access to the system, who oversaw it, or how ALPR data would be destroyed. Among the survey respondents that used ALPR, 96 percent said they had a policy. The auditor's view was that having a document and having a compliant one were different things.
The logs were also not only plates. The auditor found that Sacramento and Los Angeles were adding names, addresses, dates of birth and criminal charges to their ALPR systems, some of which may count as criminal justice information drawn from the state's law enforcement telecommunications network. A system sold as a plate reader had become, in two places, a list of people.
Who Else Can Search It
The commercial systems the agencies used made sharing easy. The auditor described features that enable convenient sharing of images with minimal effort. Fresno and Marin had each arranged to share their images with hundreds of entities. Sacramento shared with over a thousand entities across the United States.
State law permits sharing only with public agencies. The auditor did not find evidence that the agencies had always checked whether a receiving entity had a right and a need to see the images, or even that it was a public agency. Its conclusion is the sentence that gives this entry its subject: unless an agency does that verifying research, it will not know who is actually using the ALPR images and for what purpose.
Sacramento shared its plate images with over a thousand entities across the country. The auditor could not find evidence that anyone had checked that each one was even a public agency.
Then there was the question of the agencies' own staff. None of the four had audited searches of the ALPR images by their personnel. They had few safeguards on who got an account and had left accounts active that should have been disabled. The report noted that the media had, over the years, described people inside law enforcement using data systems, sometimes ALPR systems, to find out where someone regularly went, who their acquaintances were, and to blackmail them. With little to no auditing, the auditor wrote, the agencies had no assurance that misuse had not occurred.
How Long Is Long Enough
Retention was the finding that made the rest matter. Fresno's policy was to keep ALPR images for one year. Sacramento and Marin said two years. Los Angeles had no policy, and the lieutenant who ran its program told the auditors the protocol was to keep the images for at least five years.
The auditors then looked at what the agencies actually searched for. Over a six-month period in 2019, personnel at three of the four agencies typically searched for images zero to six months old. The agencies kept the images far longer than they used them. None of the four had based its retention period on how useful old images actually were to investigators. The auditor's recommendation went to the Legislature: amend state law to set a maximum retention period, and have the Department of Justice draft a model policy that local agencies could use.
Three Minutes in New Hampshire
Retention is a choice, and at least one state made a very different one. New Hampshire's statute on license plate readers, RSA 261:75-b, limits their use to official law enforcement purposes and lists what they may be used to find: stolen vehicles, wanted, missing or endangered people, owners with warrants or with suspended or revoked licenses or registrations, and vehicles tied to specific crimes or investigations.
Then it sets the clock. Plate records must be purged from the system within three minutes of capture. The exception is a scan that leads to an arrest, a citation or protective custody, or that identifies a vehicle connected to a missing person or a wanted broadcast. That data may be kept until the case is finally resolved in court. Everyone else is forgotten before the car reaches the next intersection.
The two approaches answer the same question differently. In New Hampshire the reader is a faster clipboard: it checks the list and keeps nothing it did not need. In Los Angeles in 2020 it was a five-year archive of 320 million sightings, 99.9 percent of them of people nobody was looking for.
Is a Plate Personal Information?
In Virginia, a man named Harrison Neal tested whether existing privacy law reached the log at all. He sued the Fairfax County Police Department under the Government Data Collection and Dissemination Practices Act, a state law that limits how agencies collect and keep personal information in an "information system." His target was the passive database, the 364 days of images and GPS coordinates.
The case went to the Supreme Court of Virginia twice. The first time, in 2018, the court sent it back to the trial court to decide whether the total components and operations of the ALPR record-keeping process provided a means through which a link between a license plate number and the vehicle's owner may be readily made. On remand the trial court said yes and enjoined the department's passive collection and storage of plate data.
On October 22, 2020, the Supreme Court of Virginia reversed. Under the Data Act, it said, an information system must contain both personal information and the name, personal number or other identifying particulars of a data subject. The Fairfax ALPR database held plates, images and locations, but not names. The databases that connect a plate to a person, the state motor vehicle records and the national and state criminal information networks, were separate systems that officers consulted to confirm a hit. They facilitated the investigation, the court said, but were not part of the ALPR system and did not form part of its record-keeping process. The court dissolved the injunction and entered final judgment for the police department.
The opinion did not hold that tracking cars is harmless. It held that this statute, as written, did not reach this system as configured. The practical lesson is about architecture. A log that keeps the plate in one database and the owner's name in another can sit outside a law written about records that name people, even though the link is one lookup away.
The Federal Customer
The logs are not only kept by police. Some are kept by companies, and police buy access. The Department of Homeland Security's privacy impact assessments for U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, DHS/ICE/PIA-039, first published in March 2015 and updated in December 2017 and May 2021, describe ICE's query access to a commercial license plate reader service owned by a vendor.
The December 2017 update lists where the vendor's data comes from: toll road cameras, parking lot cameras, vehicle repossession companies and law enforcement agencies. It says the vendor compiles records from at least 25 states and 24 of the 30 most populous metropolitan areas in the United States. That is the sharing problem the California auditor described, at commercial scale: images captured for one purpose, by one camera owner, made searchable by someone else.
The assessment also lists the limits ICE set. For its Enforcement and Removal Operations, queries are limited to a maximum five-year timeframe, which the document calls the approximate average length of time for vehicle ownership. For Homeland Security Investigations criminal cases the limit depends on the statute of limitations for the crime. Every query must include a plate, the plate's state, a reason code, a timeframe and a free-text reference to the case. Users may batch-upload up to 2,500 plates to a single alert list, so that new sightings are flagged as they arrive. The vendor keeps audit logs of the queries for seven years. ICE says it does not take enforcement action based solely on the commercial plate data.
Those are real controls, and they are controls on the searcher. They say nothing about whether the cars in the database belong to anyone who was ever under suspicion. The repo truck and the parking garage camera do not ask.
And Then You're Dead
Your plate is the one identifier you are required by law to display to every camera on every road. A plate reader takes that permission and turns it into a diary: where your car was, on which day, at what time, kept for three minutes in New Hampshire, for 364 days in Fairfax County, and for at least five years in Los Angeles, according to the man who ran its program. California's auditor found the people keeping those diaries had not written the required rules, had not checked who they were shared with, and had not looked at who was reading them. Virginia's highest court found that a log without your name in it is not, under that state's law, a record about you. The camera on the pole is looking for a stolen car. Nearly everything it writes down is you.
That's it. That's the whole thing.
Sources
- The four audited agencies; the 320 million Los Angeles images, 400,000 hot-list matches and 99.9 percent figure; the use of stored images to track movements; SB 34's policy, security and public-agency sharing requirements as summarized by the auditor; the policy deficiencies; the added names, addresses, dates of birth and charges; sharing with hundreds and over a thousand entities; the absence of search audits; retention of one, two and at least five years against searches typically zero to six months old; the 391-department survey (70 percent operating or planning, 96 percent reporting a policy); and the recommendations to the Legislature — California State Auditor, Report 2019-118, "Automated License Plate Readers," February 2020 (PDF)
- California's ALPR statute, enacted by SB 34 (Stats. 2015, ch. 532) — Cal. Civ. Code § 1798.90.5 et seq.
- Permitted uses and the three-minute purge with its arrest, citation, custody and missing-or-wanted exceptions — N.H. RSA 261:75-b
- Active and passive use; storage of images and GPS coordinates for 364 days; plate-only search by certified officers; the 2018 remand question; the "information system" holding; and the reversal, dissolved injunction and final judgment of October 22, 2020 — Neal v. Fairfax County Police Department, 299 Va. 253, 849 S.E.2d 123 (2020), Record Nos. 191127 and 191129, Supreme Court of Virginia; full text also in the Virginia State Crime Commission's 2024 compilation of ALPR opinions
- The commercial service's data sources and coverage; the five-year ERO query limit; required query fields; the 2,500-plate alert lists; seven-year audit logs; and no enforcement action based solely on the data — U.S. Department of Homeland Security, DHS/ICE/PIA-039(a), "Acquisition and Use of License Plate Reader (LPR) Data from a Commercial Service," December 27, 2017; publication history (March 2015, December 2017, May 2021) on the DHS PIA-039 page
- Photo: "Automated License Plate Reader Camera - New Orleans March 2020", Tony Webster, CC BY 2.0, resized, via Wikimedia Commons
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